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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes a not-for-profit healthcare provider’s strategy to provide its economically 
disadvantaged patients with access to low cost pharmaceuticals.  Initially, an in-house pharmacy 
was established, supported by a satellite distribution system using a telepharmacy solution to 
extend medications to its patients at remote sites.  New federal legislation which provided access 
to low cost insurance through Medicare Part D to many of the provider’s disadvantaged patients, 
along with state licensing requirements forced the healthcare provider to reassess the economics 
of its pharmaceutical distribution system and seek other alternatives.  Among the alternatives the 
healthcare provider considered was partnering with for-profit pharmaceutical companies in order 
to reach their patients. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
aria Montanaro, CEO of Thundermist Health Center (T-Mist), was at her desk when the phone 
rang.  “Maria, this is Ken Anderson from Walgreens.”  Maria was expecting the call.  “Ken, the 
Board is looking at all facets of your proposal and will not be ready to make a decision before their 
meeting next month.”  She knew this was not going to please him as Ken and his staff at Walgreens had spent many 
weeks with T-Mist managers discussing details of a proposed partnership for distributing pharmaceuticals to T-
Mist’s patients.  However a new player, CVS, a major competitor of Walgreens, had entered the picture.   
 
 Chris Bodine, President of CVS had approached Montanaro and asked if T-Mist would consider partnering 
with their organization.  CVS, which was headquartered in Cumberland, Rhode Island, the town next to T-Mist’s 
largest primary care facility, had an established relationship with the organization.  CVS had been a substantial 
donor to the not-for-profit health center in the past.  T-Mist’s Director of Development, Linda Reilly, had pointed 
out that the impending relationship with Walgreens could jeopardize CVS’s future philanthropy.  Maria also had to 
consider the wishes of her medical staff which had recommended maintaining the pharmacy as a not-for-profit, in-
house operation.  However, her major concern was the potential impact of the decision on the future of the 
pharmaceutical distribution operation.  What impact would this have on T-Mist’s patients, especially their low 
income, disadvantaged patients. 
 
 Maria Montanaro had been President of Thundermist for the past ten years.  Her career in community 
health spanned 19 years at the executive management level. She had served on numerous non-profit boards 
throughout both Rhode Island and New England and had worked with international medical relief organizations.  
Her responsibilities as CEO of one of the largest not-for-profit healthcare providers in Rhode Island required her to 
provide leadership and direction to the 150 employees of T-Mist.  She spent much of her time with local, state, and 
federal legislative leaders securing necessary funding to support their activities.  With the assistance of Linda Reilly, 
M 
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she had also devoted much time to developing relationships with local and state business organizations.  Over the 
last couple of years, these efforts began to pay dividends as a number of large organizations had provided T-Mist 
with valuable resources.  CVS was one of the major contributors providing both funding and pharmaceutical 
products to T-Mist.   
 
 As CEO, Montanaro was scheduled to present the organization’s strategic plan for the upcoming year to the 
Board of Trustees.  Included in this plan would be the direction she and her staff would recommend for the 
healthcare organization’s pharmacy program.  In addition to the expected questions about the strategic direction of 
T-Mist, funding priorities, and program initiatives, many of the Trustees would be concerned about the future of the 
pharmacy program and the financial implications of her recommendation.   
 
 Many members of the Board had been reluctant to endorse T-Mist’s original proposal to provide 
pharmaceuticals to their patients by creating an in-house pharmacy operation, believing that the private sector was 
better able to provide the needed service.  However, just four years prior to this meeting, Montanaro and her Senior 
Vice President/Chief Medical Officer, Dr. David Bourassa, had been able to convince the Board to support their 
request because of the expected benefits to both T-Mist and its patients.  She was now unsure of what their reaction 
would be if her recommendation was to terminate the pharmacy program and return to private sources for 
pharmaceuticals. 
 
 The economic ramifications of her recommendation on T-Mist and their patients would be a key to getting 
Board support.  Having selected many of the Board members herself, she knew they were well aware of what was 
happening both locally and nationally to the health care system.  Costs for health care had been rising at the fastest 
rate in history, accounting for 16 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP).  Health care costs were expected to 
increase to twenty percent of GDP within ten years.  The ability to afford the rising costs of health care was, 
however, not equally shared among consumers.  Coupled with the dramatic increase in costs was the increasing 
number of uninsured and underinsured.  Nationally, 37 million people lived in poverty, with an additional 25% of 
the US population depending on government insurance programs through Medicare and Medicaid.  The majority of 
the uninsured and underinsured were the young and the old (National Center for Health Statistics, 2006).  This was 
the market that T-Mist was committed to serving, a fact well known to her Board members.   
 
 Exacerbating the financial impact on individuals and families within this market was the increased cost of 
prescription drugs.  Costs for pharmaceuticals had increased more rapidly than general healthcare costs, rising from 
$12 billion in 1980 to $179.2 billion in 2003, a nearly 1400% increase (National Center for Health Statistics, 2006).     
 
THUNDERMIST HEALTH CENTER 
 
 T-Mist was founded in 1969 as a private not-for-profit family health care clinic.  The Center was 
established to provide affordable comprehensive primary medical care to the local patient population.  Its mission 
“to provide comprehensive primary care when and where it is needed most, in an affordable manner, in a language 
everyone can understand, with dignity and respect” remained the driving force behind the organization (Thundermist 
Health Center, 2008). Their targeted clients were individuals and families that lived in poverty, were medically 
uninsured, were from a minority population, or were from a cultural or socio-economic status that created barriers to 
obtaining primary health care services. 
 
Over the years, the Center had grown to be one of the largest community health care providers in Rhode 
Island, providing medical, dental, and social services to nearly 25,000 patients.  They had approximately 235 
employees located in four facilities within the state.   Since their inception, program offerings had expanded to 
include adult medicine, pediatrics, and dental care.  In 1998, the organization achieved national accreditation from 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, which was considered the “Gold Standard” in health care 
accreditation for providers.   
 
 Dr. Bourassa, long recognized as an outstanding leader and provider in community health by his peers, was 
a graduate of Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine.  He was appointed Medical Director in 1998 
and named Senior Vice President/Chief Medical Officer of T-Mist in 2003.   
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Twelve staff physicians with admitting privileges at local hospitals provided primary medical care.  The 
organization maintained a multilingual staff that could communicate with patients who spoke Spanish and 
Portuguese, along with those of Asian ancestry.  Food assistance was provided through a food pantry.  Nutritional 
counseling, psychological counseling, social service case management, extended support services to people living 
with HIV, home visits, patient education and community prevention programs were provided through partnerships 
with other agencies. Consistent with their mission, T-Mist assisted their patients in obtaining services from public 
assistance programs and other social service agencies.  
 
 T-Mist was headquartered in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, where the vast majority of their patients lived.  
Woonsocket was an old textile mill city, somewhat geographically isolated in the northern area of the state.  The city 
typified the dying mill towns of the Northeast; old and decaying housing stock with a downtown area lacking new 
business development with no large industrial base for the community. Nearly 40 percent of the 44,000 residents of 
the city had incomes at or below 200% of the federal poverty level.  From the Woonsocket facility, medical care, 
behavioral health, social services, and nutritional counseling were provided, in addition to a pharmacy and a dental 
clinic.  During 2006, T-Mist served over 13,000 medical and dental patients from the Woonsocket facility (see Table 
1).  
 
 
Table 1 
Facility Usage (Patients) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
MEDICAL:      
  Woonsocket 10533 11353 10251 10846 10578 
  South County 4421 4360 4299 4513 4139 
  West Warwick 0 0 1145 1456 1967 
DENTAL:      
  Woonsocket 2627 2078 2219 2644 2717 
  South County 2334 2465 2630 3110 3134 
  West Warwick 0 0 987 1326 1533 
(Thundermist Health Center, 2007) 
 
 
 T-Mist expanded beyond Woonsocket to offer medical and dental services to patients throughout Rhode 
Island.  Expansion began in 2002 when they merged with the Health Center of South County to form Thundermist 
South County.  This facility was located in Wakefield, Rhode Island, the geographic and population center of the 
State’s southern most county.  This center served approximately 7,500 patients out of the estimated 10,000 
medically under-served, low income people with significant health care needs in South County.     
 
 In 2004, T-Mist opened a facility in West Warwick, Rhode Island to serve the geographic center of the 
State.  T-Mist estimated that approximately 30% of the city’s population of 30,000 fell below 200% of the federal 
poverty level and that among this targeted group, approximately 50% were uninsured.  During their first full year of 
operation, T-Mist West Warwick served over 2,100 medical and dental patients, and in 2006 served over 3,500 
patients.   
 
 In the same year that the West Warwick facility was opened, T-Mist partnered with Northwest Community 
Health Care for the dispensing of pharmaceuticals only.  This organization was located in Pascoag, Rhode Island, in 
the northwest section of the state.  T-Mist estimated that approximately 7,000 medically underserved residents with 
income levels that were at or below 200% of the federal poverty level lived in the area.  The center served over 
6,200 patients in the first year, of which 18% were recipients of Medicare.  An additional 20% of the center’s 
patients were uninsured.   
 
T-Mist’s overall patient population was disproportionately poor.  Over 85% of their clients in the northern 
sector of their service area and 73% of their clients in the southern part of their service area were at or below 200% 
of the Federal poverty limit. 
 
Journal of Business Case Studies – March/April 2009 Volume 5, Number 2 
8 
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES 
 
 One of the most pressing concerns that many of T-Mist’s patients faced was acquiring necessary 
medications and pharmaceuticals to treat their medical and dental conditions.  Uninsured adults had limited access to 
affordable medications and relied heavily on local community health centers for help.   The elderly were especially 
at risk.  With a variety of health and social service needs, the elderly tended to be the most dependent on the need for 
pharmaceuticals.  Many of T-Mist’s elderly patients lived on fixed incomes, with many of these living below the 
poverty level.   
 
 Since it’s founding, T-Mist had expanded its medical and dental services, adding mental health and social 
services to its product mix to meet the growing needs of targeted customers;  however, until 2002, they were unable 
to provide their patients with necessary pharmaceutical products.  Patients were referred to private, for-profit 
pharmacies to fill their prescriptions.  Rhode Island Pharmaceutical Assistance for the Elderly (RIPAE), funding 
provided by the state, offered limited financial support for prescription drugs for the elderly.  Eligible seniors, whose 
incomes fell at or below 200% of the federal poverty level, paid up to 70% of the discounted RIPAE price for 
prescriptions if they were in the RIPAE formulary.  However, this only covered medications for the treatment of a 
limited number of conditions.  For patients who needed drugs not covered by RIPAE, and/or those who could not 
afford prescriptions written by T-Mist physicians and dentists, vouchers were provided for use at neighborhood for-
profit pharmacies.   
 
 Driven by the mission of their organization, Maria and Dr. Bourassa felt compelled to address this situation 
by providing their patients with low cost medications to support their medical and dental treatment.  To provide low 
cost pharmaceutical services to their service areas, Montanaro and her staff were confronted with three major 
barriers.  The first was the economics of setting up and operating a pharmaceutical service; the second was 
compliance with the state’s statutory requirements for operating a pharmacy; and the third was obtaining approval 
from the Board of Trustees.   
 
 Over the course of several weeks and after numerous meetings with senior administrative and medical staff 
members, one creative option emerged.  This option was to create an in-house pharmacy within the Woonsocket 
facility.  This would allow T-Mist to pass on the savings realized from low cost procurement to their patients.   
 
 Several members of T-Mist’s Board of Directors privately expressed their concern to Maria concerning the 
in-house pharmacy option.  They thought the current system, where prescriptions written by the medical and dental 
staff were filled by neighborhood pharmacies, was effective.  They also believed that the discount provided through 
the Pharmaceutical Assistance to the Elderly (RIPAE) program, which provided discounted prices to senior citizens 
and other qualifying low-income families, was sufficient.  Montanaro and Dr. Bourassa explained to the concerned 
Board members that only certain medications were eligible for discounts, and only to those patients that met the 
state’s criteria for assistance.  She also explained that T-Mist was paying, on average, $24,000 per month to 
reimburse local pharmacies for the vouchers that were provided to patients to cover their prescriptions.  The in-
house pharmacy option would eliminate these payments and ultimately save the organization money.  She also 
believed that the anticipated cost savings T-Mist could pass along to their patients would reduce patient cost below 
what they were paying to the private, for-profit pharmacies.  Based primarily on the expected cost savings T-Mist 
would pass on to their patients, Montanaro and Ernie Balasco, her Chief Financial Officer, were able to obtain the 
reluctant approval of the Board to investigate this delivery method. 
 
 Montanaro, Ernie Balasco, and Sam Limiadi, Chief Operating Officer of T-Mist, started their investigation 
by contacting the Federal Office of Pharmacy Affairs, a branch of the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA).  Through this agency, they were able to identify other health care centers throughout the country that had 
established in-house pharmacy operations.  After speaking with the operating officers of these providers and visiting 
several sites, Montanaro and her senior managers concluded that they could establish an in-house pharmacy 
operation as a Federal 340B entity, allowing T-Mist to purchase most medications at deeply discounted prices.  
Also, by entering into contracts with a large national buying association for not-for-profit community healthcare 
centers, T-Mist would be able to buy drugs from manufacturers at prices often below those available through the 
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340B Federal program.  Table 2 shows the T-Mist cost, patient price, and normal retail price for the most frequently 
prescribed pharmaceuticals (2007 prices).   
 
 
Table 2 
Prices for Pharmaceuticals (Most Frequently Dispensed Medications) 
Medication Treatment of T-Mist Cost Patient Price Retail Price 
Norvasc Chest pain (angina) $.00 * $10.00 $296.74 
Lipitor Cholesterol-Lowering $.00 * $10.00 $206.00 
Glucotrol Type II diabetes $.00 * $10.00 $49.29 
Accupril Hypertension $.00 * $10.00 $58.59 
Zoloft Anti-depresant $.00 * $10.00 $109.99 
Zyrtec Allergies $.00 * $10.00 $89.59 
HCTZ Fluid retention and high blood pressure. $0.30 $10.00 $10.99 
Loratadine Allergies $0.50 $10.00 $12.09 
Metoprolol Hypertension $0.40 $10.00 $10.99 
ProAir Asthma  $14.41 $10.00 $40.79 
OrthoTrilo Birth Control $18.94 $10.00 $53.59 
Lisinopril Hypertension $0.78 $10.00 $17.59 
*Obtained through Pfizer Share the Care Program at No Cost. 
Source: Thundermist Internal Records 
 
 
 Providing in-house pharmaceutical products and services would require a secure physical structure.  After 
exploring several options, Montanaro, Bourassa, and Limiadi selected a location within their Woonsocket primary 
care facility next to the main entrance.  There was sufficient room available to both partition it off and to provide the 
necessary security, along with providing easy access to patients.  The projected cost of construction was less than 
building another off-site facility 
 
 Another cost component that had to be considered was labor costs associated with running a pharmacy.  
State law required that only a licensed pharmacist could dispense prescription medications.  There was a limited 
availability of licensed pharmacists in the local market and the annual cost to employ one was estimated to be 
between $90,000 and $100,000 annually.  They were not sure if one pharmacist would be sufficient or if additional 
professional pharmacy employees would be required.   
 
 T-Mist hired LoriAnn Collins as Pharmacy Manager to assist them with planning and setting up the 
pharmacy program.  Collins was a licensed pharmacist, had recently attained the MBA, and had been director of 
pharmacy operations for a major educational institution.  Based on the plans and budget developed by Collins, T-
mist filed an application with the state to create an in-house pharmacy as a 340B entity in June of 2002.  A grant for 
construction cost of approximately $18,000 was obtained from HRSA, Office of Pharmacy Affairs.  Construction 
began in the summer of 2002 and by early fall of the same year, the pharmacy opened in the Woonsocket facility.  
To cover operating costs, Collins recommended that a modest fee be charged to patients, the magnitude of which 
would depend on the cost of labor and the expected volume the pharmacy would generate.   
 
Ms. Collins was hired to both manage the operation of the pharmacy and to dispense medications.  To 
inform patients of this new planned service, T-Mist provided physicians with fliers to distribute to patients as they 
were seen.  The fliers described the new pharmacy facility and the services offered.  This, along with an 
accompanying public relations release to local media, was the only promotional activities used to inform the local 
community of the new operation. 
 
The target market for the pharmacy was active patients of Thundermist, as only prescriptions written by 
Thundermist physicians or external specialists (as long as the prescription was co-signed by an in-house physician) 
could be filled.  Table 3 describes pharmacy usage from October 2002 through the second quarter of 2006.  Limiadi 
estimated that by the end of 2006 approximately 14% of their patient population in the northern service area would 
be users of the in-house facility.     
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 In December of 2002, Montanaro and Dr. Bourassa met with Collins, Limiadi, and Balasco to review the 
performance of the pharmacy operation.  Although they had not yet covered fixed costs, pharmacy usage had 
increased each month and both Montanaro and Dr. Bourassa were pleased.  Based on the apparent success of the 
Woonsocket facility, Montanaro asked Collins and Balasco to begin planning the expansion of pharmaceutical care 
to their other service areas.   
 
 
Table 3 
Pharmacy Usage – Woonsocket (prescriptions filled) 
Fiscal Year Total # of Rx's New Refill Free* 
FY 03** 6236 4184 2052 375 
FY 04 14452 8099 6353 2054 
FY 05 22561 12569 9992 5890 
FY 06 21676 12014 9662 6061 
* Samples and Manufacturer’s Program 
** FY03 – October 02 through August 03 
FY  - September 1 through August 31 
Source: Thundermist internal records 2007 
 
 
 Knowing that the ultimate success of the pharmacy operation would depend on their ability to reduce costs, 
Collins, with the support of both Montanaro and Bourassa, sought non-traditional ways to extend pharmacy services.  
Telemedicine (providing health care at a distance) was identified as an alternative to on-site, full service pharmacy 
operations.  This option would provide access to patients throughout the state without the necessity of an extensive 
on-site facility staffed by licensed pharmacists.  Telepharmacy, an application of telemedicine, eliminated the cost of 
having a licensed pharmacist at off-site facilities.  This would allow T-Mist to minimize operating costs, while 
extending the benefits of low cost procurement to their 25,000 patients statewide.   
 
 To implement this solution, hardware which provided remote dispensing of a 100-drug formulary using 
digital communication technology was obtained from Telepharmacy Solutions, Inc.  This system allowed Collins to 
dispense a drug through a machine located at each remote facility.  Patients at the remote sites talked with Collins or 
another pharmacist in the Woonsocket facility using a remote video link.  The system enabled the pharmacist to 
control dispensing of starter doses or refills directly at the point of care, and when necessary, to forward refills 
through the mail to patients.  The cost for each unit was $45,000 installed.  The ongoing software service costs were 
$15,000 per site per year.   
 
 In the spring of 2003, a grant was obtained from the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA) for funding of the hardware and the initial software for remote dispensing.  A condition for obtaining the 
funding was the establishment of a collaborative network of regional health centers.  T-Mist had merged with the 
South County organization (T-Mist South County) in 2002, so the creation of the West Warwick Health Center 
(2004) along with an alliance with the Northwest Health Center (2004) satisfied the conditions of the funding 
agency.  T-Mist purchased and installed units for each of the remote medical facilities between May and October of 
2003.   
 
 Before pharmaceuticals could be dispensed at the remote sites, state approval was needed.  While 
Montanaro, Bourassa, and Collins thought this would not be an issue, the R.I. State Licensing Board thought 
otherwise.  They was concerned with the security and safety of the system; specifically who would have access to 
the drugs and who would be releasing the medication to patients at the remote sites.  The state was also concerned 
with how information would be provided to patients regarding their medication.  Following intensive discussions 
with the Licensing Board, the state finally granted approval for T-Mist to operate the remote dispensing system, but 
only if they agreed to employ a “licensed pharmacy technician in training” for each site.  These technicians would 
be responsible for dispensing drugs to the patients at each of the remote locations, under the supervision of a 
licensed pharmacist at the Woonsocket facility.    
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 Thundermist hired and trained three individuals to qualify as “licensed pharmacy technicians” and assigned 
them to the three remote sites.  Collins and Balasco estimated the cost to employ these individuals at $50,000 each 
(the cost of the technician assigned to the Northwest Community Health Center was shared by T-Mist and its 
partner).  While training costs were difficult to determine, they estimated the training cost to be between $10,000 
and $15,000 per technician.  Operation of the remote dispensing system began in October 2003.   
 
 Drug manufacturers and wholesalers shipped product in bulk to the Woonsocket pharmacy, as volume did 
not warrant the individual pre-packaging of formulary.  Collins bar-coded the labels and filled the prescription 
containers for delivery to the remote sites.  Legal requirements mandated that the machines at these sites be filled by 
Collins or another licensed pharmacist.  Because of limited machine capacity, it was necessary for the pharmacist to 
visit each of these sites to update inventory and verify expiration dates.  Travel time to each site averaged two hours 
round trip.  The frequency of these visits depended on the volume of usage at each location.  Collins estimated that 
during the first several months of operation she would have to visit each site at least every other week. This was 
required because some formulary in the remote dispensing units would have short expiration periods, and un-
dispensed prescriptions would have to be removed from the machines.  As volume picked up, the frequency of these 
trips would also have to increase.   
 
 Patients who used the remote health centers were informed by their medical and dental providers whenever 
the prescribed medication was available through the dispensing system at a particular facility.   Availability of drugs 
through the remote dispensing system was also explained in pamphlets distributed to patients at each remote center.   
Table 4 provides patient usage of the remote sites. 
 
 
Table 4 
Pharmacy Usage – Remote Locations (prescriptions filled) 
 South County W. Warwick Northwest 3rd party collected total revenue 
 picked up not p/u picked up not p/u picked up not p/u   
FY04* 159 32 112 22 5 0 $0.00 $0.00 
FY05** 759 144 406 83 340 6 $1,318.47 $4,238.09 
FY06** 629 72 353 62 274 11 $946.17 $1,505.70 
*   FY04 – June 03 through August 04 
*   FY     – September through August 
Source: Thundermist internal records 2007 
 
 
NEW HEALTHCARE CENTER 
 
 The original treatment center for T-Mist had been located in a refurbished mill building close to a highly 
trafficked highway in an older section of Woonsocket.  The facility had limited parking for patients and staff.  The 
layout of the facility was problematic.  When new staff was added and services expanded, new offices, examination 
rooms, and treatment rooms were added wherever space was available.  This produced a layout that was confusing 
to patients, as they were required to travel the length of the building to go from an exam room to a treatment area 
and then return to meet with the medical professional.  The layout was also wasteful of the medical staff time, often 
producing backups in patient treatment.  The in-house pharmacy occupied approximately 500 square feet of space to 
the right of the entrance.  The sign-in stations for patients seeking medical or dental assistance were located to the 
right of the entrance.  
 
 In 2005 Thundermist moved into a new medical facility in the center of Woonsocket.  The new facility was 
easily accessible to patients and provided amble parking for both staff and patients.  The facility was also on the 
city’s major bus routes.  This facility incorporated the latest technology in efficient and effective design that 
welcomed patients, provided for reduced waiting times, and avoided unnecessary delays.  The new facility was 
designed to provide efficient, high quality patient care in Pediatrics, Women's Health, Adult Medicine, Social 
Services, Dental Care, and Mental Health.  The in-house pharmacy was included in the new facility.  The pharmacy 
occupied approximately 900 square feet and was located on the first floor, next to the main entry/exit.  All patients 
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had to pass the pharmacy on their way to and from the welcoming/sign-in/sign-out stations located on the second 
floor.   
 
 Montanaro had been pleased with the move to the new facility.  After the first year, her staff, especially the 
professional staff, had voiced their pleasure with the facility, and surveys of patients revealed that they too were 
pleased with the new center.  Dr. Bourassa was also pleased, as he was having an easier time recruiting and retaining 
existing staff, a situation both of them ascribed to the new facility.  Montanaro’s pleasure with the new center, 
however, was tempered by the financial performance of the pharmacy operation.  A review of financial statements 
prepared by Balasco indicated that the pharmacy had lost nearly $200,000 from September 2005 through August 
2006.  While this was less than the $240,000 the pharmacy had lost the previous fiscal year, she felt that pharmacy 
volume would grow and the financial performance would improve over time.  When initially conceived, Montanaro, 
Bourassa, Balasco, and Collins had expected the pharmacy operation to break-even by the end of the second year of 
operation and begin to make a positive contribution by the end of 2004. 
 
 The financial review revealed that T-Mist received reimbursements for 50%-60% of the prescriptions filled 
from third party payers.  For patients covered by third party insurers, T-Mist was reimbursed based on the average 
wholesale price (AWP) for the medication.  The AWP was specific to each medication, however on average it 
amounted to 50% of the retail price of the medication.  From the AWP, insurers would deduct a fee, or discount 
ranging from 15% to 25% of the AWP.  Self-paying patients, those not covered by third party insurers, paid the 
340B price that T-Mist paid, plus the $5 dispensing fee.  If the patient could not afford the fee and the 340B price of 
the medication, both were waived.      
 
 Initially, T-Mist charged a $5 fee for each prescription filled.  After the first full year of operation, Collins 
estimated that the pharmacy operation was losing $3 for each prescription filled.  The dispensing fee was raised in 
March of 2006, when Montanaro reluctantly agreed to raise the fee to $8 per prescription.  The fee was again raised 
in November of 2006 to $10 for each prescription filled.  Patients given prescriptions for drugs not stocked by the 
in-house or remote site units were given vouchers for neighborhood for-profit pharmacies.  The cost of the vouchers 
and the loss of the dispensing fee for patients who could not afford to pay were estimated at $1000 per month.    
 
 Balasco estimated that fixed costs, which included the cost of allocated rent for space, and labor, which 
included the pharmacist and licensed pharmacists in training, were approximately $400,000 per year.  Labor costs 
alone were estimated to be $100,000 for the pharmacist, $65,000 for a part-time pharmacist, and $50,000 for each 
in-house pharmacy technician.  Collins estimated that nearly forty percent of her time was spent in administrative 
tasks which included managing the dispensing of prescription drugs through the remote sites.     
 
 Dr. Bourassa was also concerned with the poor financial performance of the pharmacy.  However, unlike 
Montanaro, who believed the financial problems were caused by the inability to generate sufficient volume through 
the remote sites, Bourassa believed the problems were caused by the inability to manage operating costs, especially 
at the remote sites.  He felt that the cost burden imposed by the state requiring licensed technicians at each of the 
remote sites was the cause of the financial problems.  He estimated that this cost the pharmacy operation an 
additional $150,000 per year when training and benefit costs were added. 
 
Although Montanaro believed that the expansion of the system to the remote locations and the failure to 
meet volume projections at these  sites contributed to the inability to break even, she was pleased and encouraged by 
the growth in volume at the Woonsocket facility.  Through 2005, volume had grown steadily, approaching nearly 
23,000 prescriptions filled.   However, volume declined during 2006.  With the move to the new facility, volume 
was expected to increase. 
 
 The pharmacy operation had experienced several other major problems during 2006.  LoriAnn Collins, 
Pharmacy Director and lead pharmacist, resigned to take another position in April and a part-time pharmacist, who 
had been hired the previous year to support the growth in volume at the Woonsocket facility, resigned two months 
later.  The replacement pharmacist T-Mist hired to manage the pharmacy was placed on medical leave shortly after 
starting employment in May.  Unable to recruit a full-time licensed pharmacist, partly because of a severe shortage 
of pharmacists in the Northeast, T-Mist was forced to temporarily close the pharmacy operation.  The remote sites 
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were also closed because medications could not be released without a pharmacist on site in the Woonsocket facility.  
During this period of time, patients that had been receiving their prescriptions through the in-house pharmacy were 
once again provided with vouchers and directed to local for-profit pharmacies to obtain their medications.  When T-
Mist was able to reopen the pharmacy six weeks later, additional staffing problems involving licensed pharmacy 
technicians forced them to limit the hours of operation. 
 
 Montanaro agreed with Dr. Bourassa’s assessment concerning labor costs.  She had shared with both 
Bourassa and Balasco her fear that even if costs could be brought under control, the loss of volume that had occurred 
both during and after the six week closure would hinder the effort to return to levels necessary to breakeven.  What 
was most disturbing to her was the apparent loss of patients who had third party coverage.  The financial 
information indicated that reimbursements from third party insurers fell following the six week closure.  Some 
patients appeared to have left the in-house pharmacy for other pharmacies in the area.  Cash payers, patients that had 
no other choice but to remain with the pharmacy to receive low or no cost pharmaceuticals, returned.   
 
 Montanaro realized T-Mist could not afford to underwrite a continuing deficit in the pharmacy operations.  
Although cash paying patients and patients who could not afford to pay were the targeted customers for the in-house 
pharmacy, patients covered by third party payers were critical sources of revenue.  Without reimbursement from 
these insurers, funding for the pharmacy would have to be provided from other T-Mist programs.  Bourassa believed 
that it was simply a question of time until these patients began to again use the in-house pharmacy, and with careful 
control of costs, volume could be increased to breakeven.  Montanaro was not as confident.  
 
 What made any decision to curtail or further limit pharmacy services was the realization that their patients 
had benefited from the in-house pharmacy operation.  Patients were paying reduced federal 340B pricing for their 
medications plus the $10 dispensing.  Collins had estimated that patients that used the in-house pharmacy saved an 
average of 30%-40% off normal retail prices.  If patients were unable to afford the dispensing fee, it was waived.  
For uninsured and indigent patients, T-Mist leveraged patient assistant programs to access free medications from 
pharmaceutical companies.  Collins estimated that they received approximately $450,000 worth of no-cost drugs 
annually from these programs.  
 
 In early October, 2006, after completing the review of the fiscal year financial performance, Montanaro 
asked her administrative, medical, and dental staff to develop options to stem the pharmacy’s operating losses.  One 
option Dr. Bourassa and several senior members of the administrative and medical staff preferred was to focus on 
increasing volume at both the in-house facility and the remote dispensing sites.  They felt that this would be the most 
appropriate action and would allow T-Mist to spread the labor costs over a greater unit volume without having to 
again increase the dispensing fee charged to patients.  They also believed that this option was consistent with their 
organization’s mission and that it would continue to allow them to charge prices below what other options would 
allow.  They noted that the Woonsocket in-house pharmacy, other than 2006, had consistently grown its volume 
since opening in October 2002.  Usage data indicated that up until the Woonsocket pharmacy was temporarily 
closed, most patients who received their initial prescriptions there continued to use the pharmacy for refills.    
 
 Proponents of this option pointed to the location of the pharmacy and the knowledge among patients, 
physicians, and staff of the availability of prescribed medications.  At the Woonsocket facility, patients were 
reminded by staff “greeters,” placed strategically at the entrance/exit to the sign-in station, to make sure they fill or 
refill their prescriptions at the pharmacy on the way out.  Since the initial opening of the pharmacy, physicians, with 
consistent reminding from staff, had communicated to patients the convenience and economy of the in-house 
pharmacy.    
 
Proponents also believed that the “spokes” of the pharmacy system (the remote access sites) had a positive 
impact on patients.  Although volume growth at the remote sites was slow, the network provided low cost 
medications to patients in locations too small to support an in-house pharmacy.  This, they argued, was the reason 
for creating the pharmacy program in the first place.  They suggested that redesigning the layout at the remote sites  
to increase visibility, along with having the staff continue to aggressively promote remote pharmacy usage, would 
increase volume to a level comparable to the Woonsocket site.  Also, with sufficient volume, it would be 
economically feasible to contract with a pharmaceutical prepackaging company to directly send medications to the 
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remote sites, thus relieving the pharmacist in Woonsocket from the burden of prepackaging and labeling the 
medications.   Some administrators also expressed their belief that the pharmacy should sell non-prescription drug 
products with a sufficient markup to alleviate the operating deficit.  Some of the products they suggested selling 
included soda, magazines, snacks, and greeting cards.   
 
 Dr. Bourassa noted another advantage of this option; it provided greater control of the prescribing behavior 
of the medical staff.  He believed that the in-house pharmacy operation gave medical staff the ability to use 
formulary control to better manage the cost of pharmaceutical therapy by influencing the prescribing behavior of 
their physicians.  Patients benefited from better adherence to treatment plans when they received their prescriptions 
at the health center instead of going to an off-site pharmacy.  He also believed that T-Mist was a more effective 
advocate for addressing patients’ inability to pay than a for-profit pharmacy would be.  
 
 What concerned Montanaro about this option was the ability to control costs. The cost that was of most 
concern was the cost of the pharmacists. Both she and Ernie Balasco felt that the cost to meet the state’s statutory 
requirements would continue to be a major burden.  It appeared to them that due to the small size of the remote 
dispensing machines, the cost of prepackaging the medications, and the time spent by the pharmacist restocking the 
machine, they would have trouble reaching a breaking-even point unless major changes were made.  Bourassa noted 
that if the formulary was not tightly controlled, medications stocked in the remote access machines would not turn-
over quickly and would exceed the expiration date, producing waste and additional cost.  Although the system was 
user friendly, there was the added cost for training technicians as required by the state’s licensing board.  As only 
the pharmacist or a trained technician could release medications to patients, it was expected that staffing would 
remain a critical problem.  While Dr. Bourassa liked the formulary control provided by the system, he was also 
concerned that the limited formulary stocked in the machines at the remote sites would continue to impact the 
medical options that staff members considered for patients.  
 
 Another factor that had to be considered was the impact of the recently enacted Federal Medicaid PART D 
program, which became operational on January 1, 2006, and which provided coverage for numerous formularies for 
citizens covered under Medicaid.  Many of T-Mist’s patients were affected by this program which covered the cost 
of drugs up to a break point of $2400.  From $2400 to $3600 (the “Donut Hole”), the individual paid out of pocket 
expenses.  Above $3600, the individual’s expenses for drugs were not covered.  This option also required a co-pay 
for many medications along with a monthly enrollment fee. 
 
 The competitive environment at the retail pharmaceutical level had also changed.  Giant retailers, including 
Wal-Mart and Target, had entered the retail pharmacy market.  Both chains provided generic drugs at a cost of $4.  
Although many of T-Mist’s patients would benefit from this option, newer drugs, which were still covered by their 
original patent, were not available as generics.   
 
 While attending a national conference of health center executives in October, 2006, another option had 
come to Montanaro’s attention; the possibility of a partnership with a retail pharmaceutical company.   At the 
conference she had met Ken Anderson, a long-time friend who was employed by Walgreens, a large national for-
profit pharmacy.  She shared with Anderson the problems her organization was having operating the in-house and 
remote site pharmacy operation.  After he listened to Montanaro describe T-Mist’s problems, he bluntly asked the 
CEO what business they were in.  Before she could answer, he suggested a possible partnership between T-Mist and 
Walgreens, with Walgreens serving as a contract pharmacy provider.  He reminded her that Walgreens was in the 
retail pharmacy business and had been in business for over 100 years, growing in size to over 6000 stores.  
Dispensing pharmaceuticals was their business and they were very good at it.  He explained that Walgreens had 
partnered with another health care provider in Connecticut to the benefit of both the health care provider and 
Walgreens.   
 
 After returning from the conference, Montanaro shared her conversation with the Walgreens executive with 
Bourassa and Balasco.  Both suggested she get more information.  She then contacted Ken Anderson who put her in 
touch with the Walgreens central offices.  Walgreens explained that they wanted to take over the dispensing of 
formulary prescribed by T-Mist physicians, through their network of retail pharmacies.  They would charge patients 
the same price that T-Mist was charging.  Additionally, they would provide an expanded set of medications that 
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were not available through the in-house pharmacy or through the remote dispensing sites.  These medications would 
be provided at 340B prices.  This would relieve T-Mist from redirecting funds from medical and social service 
programs in 2007 to support the projected $250,000 operating deficit of the pharmacy.  The Walgreens proposal 
would also free up space at both the Woonsocket treatment facility and the remote locations.   
 
 As Montanaro discussed the Walgreens proposal with her staff, Sam Limiadi pointed out that although 
Walgreens had twenty retail locations in Rhode Island, there were no pharmacies located near their south county 
health center. He wondered where the patients that were treated at this facility would get their medications.     
 
 While trying to decide what the most prudent course of action would be, Linda Reilly, Vice President of 
Development called her.  “Maria, I understand you are about to make a commitment to Walgreens to take over 
operations of our pharmacy.”  Montanaro quickly stopped Linda from continuing.  She was more than a little upset 
that news about the discussions with Walgreens had leaked out.  “Linda, I do not know what you have heard, but I 
have not yet made any decision as to what will be the future of the pharmacy.  We have a number of options we are 
considering.” 
 
 Linda continued, “I’m glad to hear that.  I would like to point out that if one of your options is to look to an 
outside organization for assistance, considering a partnership with Walgreens may jeopardize the relationship we 
have spent years building with CVS.  They have provided over $100,000 of support in terms of funding, products, 
and services in just the last year alone.  This coming year we had intentions of asking them to double that amount.  If 
they hear that we are considering a partnership with Walgreens, which happens to be their major competitor, I 
expect they will reassess their relationship with us.”     
 
 “Linda, thank you for the information.  The relationship you have been able to develop over the years with 
CVS is important to T-Mist and we do not want to jeopardize it”, responded Montanaro.  She immediately placed 
calls to Bourassa, Balasco, and Limiadi and shared with them Reilly’s concerns. She knew only too well that T-Mist 
depended on the goodwill and philanthropy of area for-profit organizations.  After much effort, they had been able 
to cultivate a relationship with CVS, and were able to solicit donations of both services and products.  They 
expected that this philanthropy would increase in the future.  Limiadi suggested that they should contact officials at 
CVS and explain what T-Mist’s goals were and provide CVS with an opportunity to “react” to a potential 
partnership with Walgreens.  The other key managers agreed that CVS should be contacted. 
 
 Montanaro informed Linda of her decision to contact CVS.   She also indicated that if CVS were willing to 
discuss a similar type of arrangement, she and her senior staff would delay making any decision concerning the 
pharmacy.  She was sympathetic with her VP’s desire to maintain the relationship with CVS, realizing she had also 
committed much time and effort to developing the relationship with the retail pharmacy giant.    
 
 The next day, Montanaro placed a call to Chris Bodine, President of CVS and explained T-Mist’s desire to 
explore privatizing their pharmacy operations.  She also informed him that T-Mist was involved in negotiations with 
another pharmacy chain (which she did not identify) to take over the operations of the pharmacy.  She asked Bodine 
if CVS would have an interest in discussing this type of arrangement.  Bodine indicated that CVS would be 
interested and that they were actively seeking relationships of this type.  He explained that T-Mist, being in the back 
yard of CVS corporate headquarters, would be an attractive potential partner and could provide CVS with 
experience in an area they had targeted for expansion.  He emphasized that CVS could offer T-Mist patients the 
most expansive network of pharmacies in the state, in addition to having just developed an advanced information 
system to manage 340B pricing. 
 
 CVS Caremark was the nation's largest retail pharmacy chain, with approximately 6,200 stores across 38 
states. Within the state of Rhode Island, CVS had nearly 50 retail pharmacies, with 5 located in South County.  CVS 
generated over 68% of it’s approximately $37 billion net revenue from the pharmacy business, and in 2006 filled 
more than one of every seven retail prescriptions in the United States.  Their “ExtraCare Program” had over 50 
million cardholders, making it the largest retail loyalty program in the country.  Over the past two years, CVS had 
completed the integration of over 1,200 Eckerd and 700 Sav-on and Osco drugstores as part of an aggressive 
national growth program.  
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 Time was running out.  The Board meeting was approaching and she had not yet decided which option was 
best to deal with the pharmacy problems.  As the CEO of Thundermist Health Center, the recommendation to the 
Board was her responsibility; however the advice of her key executives was critical to her decision.  Montanaro 
asked Bourassa, Limiadi, Reilly, and Balasco to meet her in her office that afternoon.  Decisions had to be made.   
 
EPILOGUE 
 
 On June 25, 2007, Thundermist announced that it had turned over its in-house pharmacy program to CVS 
Caremark Corporation.  According to Montanaro, the reason behind this move was to eliminate the in-house 
pharmacy’s growing deficit and still provide pharmaceuticals at low prices to patients.    
 
 The relationship they had negotiated required CVS to take over retail operations of the in-house pharmacy 
in the Woonsocket center and to provide pharmaceuticals to patients at the remote sites using retail pharmacies 
located close to T-Mist’s South County and West Warwick facilities.  The relationship with the northwest center 
was not included in the agreement as CVS was unable to provide convenient access to pharmaceuticals through a 
local retail store.  CVS agreed to provide the 100 formularies that were contained in the remote dispensing devices 
at the same prices that Thundermist had been charging.  Montanaro felt that CVS would also be able to provide a 
larger variety of products and services to their patients than their own in-house pharmacy and remote dispensing 
devices were able to provide, and at reduced prices.   
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